Twentieth century institutions of global economic governance face a profound challenge adapting to the rise of emerging markets, especially China. This is especially the case for an international tax regime based on norms that favour capital exporting states, and whose institutional home is the OECD. To understand the nature of the challenge posed by China, we focus on its engagement with a foundational norm of the international tax regime: the arm's length principle (ALP). We show that China's approach to tax cooperation is characterised by a set of apparent contradictions: conciliatory language hides an assault on the ALP; rhetoric of common cause with developing countries is contradicted by actions that maximise only China's own share of the tax 'pie'; a willingness to court the OECD relies on the leverage gained from flirtation with outside options. In these respects China appears increasingly to be using its market power to seek special privileges within international regimes, in ways that mirror the historical actions of the 1 With a predominant focus on trade governance, as well as on the global system of reserve currencies and the overseas development aid architecture, this literature appears to be settling on a consensus that China is a cautious reformist, rather than seeking more dramatic change. The consequence is a distinct set of Chinese strategies, which may reveal much about the evolution of both international tax debates and China's broader global ambitions. On one hand, China has engaged actively with existing, and historically western-led, institutions of global tax governance, offering vocal support for an unprecedented reform of international tax rules led by the OECD. On the other hand, within those negotiations China has adopted a quietly aggressive stance, launching a subtle, but profound, challenge to OECD orthodoxy through the concept of 'Location Specific Advantages' (LSAs), which allows it to secure an expanded share of global tax revenues. Presented as a narrow intervention in a highly technical debate, LSAs in fact represent a potentially profound challenge to OECD orthodoxy, and reveal China's growing power and assertiveness in seeking to shape global economic governance within multilateral fora.
Introduction
How will the rise of China and other large emerging markets affect the liberal economic order created in the last century, largely by OECD states? Will existing institutions of economic cooperation be transformed to accommodate rising powers, embraced by them in their existing form, or fall by the wayside? This puzzle has motivated a vibrant strand of international relations scholarship in recent years.
1 With a predominant focus on trade governance, as well as on the global system of reserve currencies and the overseas development aid architecture, this literature appears to be settling on a consensus that China is a cautious reformist, rather than seeking more dramatic change. 2 Nonetheless, 4 various observers have noted increasing deadlock on the global stage arising from the proliferation of divergent preferences in global forums. 3 However, by focusing on a cross-cutting narrative, this emerging consensus does not help us to understand how Chinese strategies may vary across issues areas and over time. 4 The impact of China's rise in a given area of global economic governance will be influenced by three variables: the distribution of interests between states that determines the lines of conflict and cooperation, the determinants of state power and their distribution, and the problem structure of the issue in question. Interacting with each of these is change over time. The changing distribution of economic power is a dynamic process that interacts with profound changes underway in the nature of economic production, trade and capital flows. Countries' interests in this environment are not static, but evolving, just as are their capabilities.
We illustrate this schema using an area of global economic governance that has been frequently overlooked in international relations scholarship, but has become increasingly politicised in recent years: international taxation, and in particular, the division of multinational firms' taxable profits between states. China's interests in this area are described by Chinese officials as 'unique and inimitable', as they are rapidly shifting from those of a capital importer and low value-added manufacturer towards those of a allows it to chart its own path without fear of market sanctions that less powerful countries might face from unilateral actions. Pulling against these dynamics is a constant: the nature of the issue area itself. This area of tax cooperation is a coordination game with distributive conflict, which is characterized by very strong pressures for global cooperation. 5 This distinguishes tax from the issue areas that have dominated the existing literature on China in global governance, which have tended to be prisoner's dilemma issues with stronger incentives for states to defect.
The consequence is a distinct set of Chinese strategies, which may reveal much about the evolution of both international tax debates and China's broader global ambitions. On one hand, China has engaged actively with existing, and historically western-led, institutions of global tax governance, offering vocal support for an unprecedented reform of international tax rules led by the OECD. On the other hand, within those negotiations China has adopted a quietly aggressive stance, launching a subtle, but profound, challenge to OECD orthodoxy through the concept of 'Location Specific Advantages' (LSAs), which allows it to secure an expanded share of global tax revenues. Presented as a narrow intervention in a highly technical debate, LSAs in fact represent a potentially profound challenge to OECD orthodoxy, and reveal China's growing power and assertiveness in seeking to shape global economic governance within multilateral fora.
Meanwhile, behind a rhetoric of solidarity with developing countries, China has increasingly appeared to pursue its narrow national self-interest, which diverges from that of economies with less market power. This Janus-faced approach to tax cooperation mirrors the historical actions of the United States. The remainder of the paper begins with a review of the literature on China's role in global economic governance. Section three then discusses the institutions of international tax cooperation, introducing the 'Arm's Length Principle' (ALP), on which the analysis is focused. The following two sections turn to analyzing China's engagement with the reform of international tax rules, with a focus on its advocacy for reliance on 'Location Specific Advantages' in allocating taxing rights across countries. The final section concludes.
China, global economic governance and international taxation
A growing literature has asked whether major emerging markets economies are likely to cooperate with existing institutions of global economic governance, or adopt a more conflictual stance. China is seen as having been comparatively cautious, neither playing a major agenda-setting role nor seeking to make the system more inclusive for developing countries writ large, despite its rhetoric. 6 Several explanations have been offered: lack of consensus on a new national role, 'pre-emptive restraint' to avoid a backlash which could threaten its economic growth, a desire for sovereignty and independence, and limited Recent estimates suggest that the impact of MNC profit shifting on tax revenues is about twice as large in developing countries, as a share of GDP.
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A second area of criticism proposes that the OECD's interpretation of the ALP naturally advantages capital exporting countries, and owners of intellectual property, while disadvantaging capital importers. Under OECD guidelines profit is allocated across countries, through the system of transfer pricing, based on the assumed value-added of different activities within the global value chain. In practice, the guidelines allow MNCs to treat their routinized manufacturing activities in developing countries as low valueadded, assigning them a correspondingly small share of global profits. MNCs naturally prefer to assign as much value as possible to the owners of intellectual property and services, primarily in the OECD countries among which the rules were developed and where they are headquartered, or in tax havens. Emerging markets and their allies contend that the OECD approach allows firms to undervalue the activities that tend to occur in developing countries, thus denying them their rightful share of global profits and tax revenues.
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These critiques are reinforced by the risk of more powerful states defecting from the OECD guidelines and defining national rules that give them a larger share of the tax base.
For the most part the incentives to conform exceed those to defect, but larger, more where economic activities generating the profits are performed and where value is created," with the arm's length principle near the heart of the discussions. 24 While driven by tax concerns within OECD countries, the process involved broad global consultations, with the OECD presenting itself not as a representative of OECD states, but as a convening body, consulting globally, and directed by the more representative G20.
Ultimately, the BEPS final reports and recommendations, published in 2015, amounted to the most significant proposed revisions to international tax rules in at least a generation, with over 100 countries signing the shrewdly-titled 'Inclusive Framework' on BEPS, which has since begun to be implemented around the world.
However, despite some significant initiatives, the BEPS proposals failed to fully address the concerns of developing countries and large emerging markets, including China.
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Most critically to the discussion here, the OECD actively defended OECD guidelines on 
China's rapidly evolving interests and influence
The traditional dividing line in international tax debates has been between those that export capital (historically, OECD countries) and those that import it, with the latter constrained by the OECD's guidelines on applying the ALP. Historically, China was easily placed in the latter group, but it increasingly defies easy categorization: it officially became a net capital exporter in 2016, 28 but also remains a major recipient of inward investment.
China's correspondingly shifting interests can be seen in relation to bilateral tax treaties, which translate OECD soft law into hard law. These treaties broadly serve to constrain the taxing rights of capital importing countries. However, there have historically been two global models, maintained by the OECD and UN, with the latter imposing fewer restrictions on capital importing developing countries. In its earliest negotiations, China was willing to accept treaties with OECD members on their terms, despite the fiscal China's tax priorities. They identify four such shifts, set out in Table 1 , which also constitute four axes of conflict between states. China expects in the future to become a net exporter of capital, to move its comparative advantage from low-skilled towards highskilled labour, to become increasingly driven by domestic demand -driving a shift in its current account towards more imports and fewer exports -and to upgrade its position in global value chains towards high-skilled high-value added research and development. These shifts explain China's changing interests around international taxation. In the past China's interests were closely aligned with other developing countries, with a focus on how to effectively tax subsidiaries of multinational enterprises in China. In the future its interests appear set to more closely resemble those of capital exporting, high value-added OECD countries. In the present it faces the need for policy solutions that meet both needs at once: satisfying its immediate revenue needs as a major recipient of low valued-added foreign investment, while ensuring that those same rules will provide maximum future benefits to Chinese firms investing overseas, and increasingly focusing on intellectual property and other intangibles. "China was a factor-driven economy. China is now an The centrepiece of China's answer to this question is the concept of location specific advantages (LSA). 50 Imagine an MNC that relocates a key aspect of its manufacturing operations from a high cost location (e.g. the United States) to a lower-cost jurisdiction (e.g. China). The manufacturing activity in China generates a 'routine' profit, but the MNC may also generate substantial additional profits as a result of the arbitrage. OECD rules generally allow MNCs to attribute these additional profits away from their local operating companies and towards other areas of the firm, in particular its home country or a tax haven intermediary, commonly through payments for the use of intangible assets.
The host country subsidiary, by contrast, is only assigned a limited profit margin, consistent with being a simple contract manufacturer. As described by Li and Ji: "The default position is that benefits from location savings are allocated away from the local The Chinese contention -embedded in the LSA concept -is that a portion of the 'super profits' that arise by virtue of operating in China should accrue, for tax purposes, to the The SAT position is that China offers advantages not available anywhere else, which means firms operating in China are more profitable than comparable firms elsewhere.
This might include a large, skilled labour force, high quality infrastructure, unique expertise, agglomeration benefits, and a large, relatively untapped consumer market. There is a large supply of high quality, low cost parts made locally.
Market premiums
Foreign firms are obliged to supply technology to the local manufacturing subsidiary at lower prices to access the Chinese market, increasing the latter's profitability.
Chinese consumers have a "general preference for foreign brands and imported products" that mean MNCs can charge higher prices.
The large consumer market creates "huge, inelastic demand for automotive vehicles in China."
There are capacity constraints on the supply of domestically assembled automotive vehicles, reducing competition.
Source: UN transfer pricing manual/Peng (2017) China's implementation of LSAs -both location savings and market premia -increases the share of MNCs' profits that should be assigned to their Chinese subsidiaries to be taxed, but in doing so it violates the ALP. First, China regards LSAs as a way of internalising value-adding characteristics of the local market within a firm's profits.
Some of the items in Table 2 Value is created by capital, by labor, by intangibles, but all of this happens in the market. The market has comparative advantage. The market has specific characteristics, which differ from one country to another, which explains why some companies lose money in their own market but once they move to
China make a huge amount of money.
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The emphasis on intrinsic properties of the market here points to a key difference in China's interpretation of LSAs, in comparison to the orthodox OECD position. The OECD, as articulated by Robert Stack, the lead US representative to the BEPS process, is that "the mere presence of a market is not an asset of the taxpayer to which profits are typically allocated under the guidelines." 56 This is because, while a market may offer certain advantages of the nature described by China, firms need to capture these advantages as location-specific rents if they are to be relevant to an assessment of the firm's profitability. OECD rules presume that this does not take place, and that the LSAs lead instead to lower consumer prices or more profits for independent contractors.
Central to the conceptual challenge presented by China's use of LSAs is the presumption that foreign investors come to China in search of LSAs, and successfully capture them as rents.
Indicative of these tensions, the Indian tax authority has sought to implement a similar approach, but has stumbled at this conceptual hurdle, with Indian courts rejecting the use OECD rules have historically proposed that the profitability of an MNC subsidiary should be assessed in isolation, in comparison to a locally-owned independent enterprise.
By contrast, LSAs imply that "you should take the group as a whole." 61 As the Chinese contribution to the UN transfer pricing manual in 2017 states:
With more and more companies poised to conduct business as groups, economic activities are more and more likely to take place in the inner circle of MNE groups. It is nearly impossible to take out one piece of a value chain of an MNE group and try to match it to comparable transactions/companies. China's increasing focus on market premiums -and OECD resistance to them -appears linked to China's planned transition from "world factory to world market", which will make market premiums increasingly important in tax terms. And for the time being
China appears to be moving ahead with the inclusion of market premiums in its calculation of LSAs, despite OECD objections.
Beyond Conflict versus Cooperation
Existing literature on China's role in global economic governance has tended, explicitly or implicitly, to present a dichotomy: would China seek to cooperate with existing, western-led, global institutions, or to challenge or undermine them? Most of the literature has pointed toward relatively cooperative strategies, integrating into existing institutions while pushing for only modest "balancing" reforms. 67 This has been mirrored in the rhetoric of OECD governments that have sought to "socialize" China into existing frameworks of global economic governance, in hopes of forestalling more aggressive
Chinese efforts to exploit their growing economic power on the global stage. Social States: China in International Institutions, 1980 -2000 . (Princeton University Press, 2007 81 However, that literature has also highlighted the tension between official ideologies stressing cooperation and China's desire to reclaim its former status as a great power. 82 The experience of international tax reform points toward the importance of the latter in contributing to an emerging form of exceptionalism. In this case at least, and mirroring the United States before it, China's purportedly exceptional characteristics have acted as justification for using its market power to press for unique advantages.
More broadly, China has been strategically Janus-faced: presenting a more cooperative public face, while pursuing more specific and narrow benefits in parallel. In retrospect it is perhaps unsurprising that China would exploit its growing market power to pursue such advantages, while shifting its focus away from meaningful solidarity with other developing countries. Yet both developments stand in contrast to earlier trends in China's engagement in multilateral fora, and suggest the rapid evolution of China's priorities and capabilities in relation to global economic governance.
Conclusion: What Comes Next?
The recent reform of international tax rules offers a fresh look at Chinese engagement with global economic governance, and challenges dominant narratives. Far from a cautious participant, China has been highly visible in recent reform efforts, has embraced and implemented significant new global rules and has diplomatically but forcefully secured a profound, if subtle, change to those rules. It has, in turn, diverged still further from global rules in its domestic implementation by exploiting the margins available to a powerful state when implementing global soft law. Indeed, the very same location specific advantages that China seeks to tax offer it significant market power and negotiating leverage, allowing it to break from the OECD consensus without jeopardising First, the strategies described here may offer a relatively clear view of China's emerging approach. China will seek to exploit its market power to secure specific advantages, and increase its visibility as a global power, but while minimizing conflict and avoiding undermining core pillars of the existing institutional order. In this view China's engagement is increasingly coherent and assertive, but fundamentally pragmatic and incrementalist. Recognizing that its long-term interests are likely to increasingly align with those of the old powers, a combination of incremental changes at global level and selective unilateralism offers greater flexibility to adapt as China's place in the global economy evolves.
Second, by design or accident the Chinese challenge to the ALP may prove to be the first step in a process of more dramatic reform, which will place increasing stress on existing institutions and rules. To accept the premise of LSAs is to concede that the purportedly "neutral" ALP promoted by the OECD in fact has important distributional implications, biasing the system against developing countries. Such a discussion was explicitly taken off the table during the BEPS negotiations. 86 Yet by opening cracks in the existing system, LSAs may lead other countries -perhaps led by other large emerging marketsto seek their own accommodations, thus placing increasing strain on the multilateral foundations of the international tax system. While far from assured, the potential for initially small challenges to existing orthodoxy to create a snowball effect of expanding 85 Li, "China and BEPS: From Norm-Taker to Norm-Shaker," p370. 86 OECD, "Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting" 
